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Abstract: 
Financial stability remains a key theme globally in view of the Eurozone debt crisis. The latest 
strategy by Germany and France is to ring-fence the crisis amongst the PIIGS countries: Portugal, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain.  In the UK, the big four major banks have all responded to the 
Independent Commission of Banking’s interim report key recommendation: ring-fencing retail 
operations into a separate subsidiary of any bank which wishes to operate in the UK. The report has 
clearly discussed the advantages and disadvantages of various types of subsidiarisation. Retail ring-
fencing is considered a compromise since full subsidiarisation is too costly and operational 
subsidiarisation is too minimal. The Independent Commission of Banking published its final report on 
12th September 2011. They recommended ring-fencing retail banking and a 10% equity baseline. 
This paper focuses on structural reforms of UK banks. It aims to address the question of financial 
stability from a wider European perspective. The first question is whether cross-border retail 
banking in the EEA is best served by branches or subsidiaries? The second question concerns the 
legality of setting up subsidiaries in the European Union. Whilst there are no legal problems for UK 
based banks setting up subsidiaries for their retail activities, there might be a legal hurdle for 
requiring foreign banks setting up subsidiaries in the UK. The third question concerns EU cross-
border banking regulation and supervision. Are the ‘passporting system’ and the home country 
supervisory approach still applicable in this post-financial crisis era? 
Many factors influence the choice of setting up branches or subsidiaries. However, the general 
position is that branches are more suited for wholesale/investment activities due to ease of funds 
transfer. Subsidiaries are more suitable for retail banking due to the limited liability principle and 
extensive local network. Effective cross-border banking must be accompanied by effective 
supervision and resolution regimes. The ‘passporting’ concept under EU law and home country 
dominance are somewhat dated post-financial crisis. Host country control should play a dominant 
part in financial regulation, especially in light of the importance of subsidiaries and the limited 
liability principle associated with them. The Icelandic bank crisis and collapse of Lehman Brothers 
International Europe illustrate the importance of host country control. Finally, the author argues 
that requiring banks to hold its retail activities in the form of subsidiaries in another European 
country is necessary to achieve financial stability.  
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Section 1: Introduction 
In his Mansion House speech of 14th June 2011, the Chancellor George Osborne accepted the 
Independent Commission on Banking’s proposal of partial bank subsidiarisation: that by building a 
capital buffer of 10% of risk-weighted assets around those retail banking operations, it would be 
easier to allow riskier investment banking operations to fail leaving the retail side of banking intact. 
Subsidiarisation may be seen as a compromise between politicians and bankers. Whilst the US 
government has implemented the Volcker rule, which is a form of full separation in that it prevents 
common ownership of banks and entities which conduct such activities, UK politicians have not 
taken the draconian step of full subsidiarisation. On 13th July 2011, Britain’s major banks responded 
to the Independent Commission on Banking’s interim proposals. They criticised the concept of ring-
fencing and called for a cost benefit analysis (1). However, they acknowledged that ring-fencing is 
more than likely to be implemented. The issue is one of form. Santander advocates for a de minimis 
rule whereby banks with very small retail operations should be exempt from ring-fencing. Standard 
Chartered believe that ring-fencing the retail side of banks would impose a financial strain on 
taxpayers which would also encourage risky lending, They advocated for a narrow definition of retail 
banking and to permit funds transfer between different operations of banks (2). They rejected 
HSBC’s proposal of a wider definition of retail ring-fencing should be done according to geographic 
operations. Subsidiaries will be set up according to the country where the business operates. The 
aim is to prevent cross-infection and contamination between the different subsidiaries. Geographical 
subsidiarisation is thus their policy. RBS called for a wide definition of ring-fencing to include parts of 
investment banking. Further, they argued that only UK based subsidiaries which already exist and 
identified by the FSA as holding more liquidity should be ring-fenced. Barclays meanwhile prefer 
‘operational subsidiarisation’-- ring-fencing the main operations of a bank (such as IT, third-party 
contract) when a bank fails but no prior division (2). The Independent Commission on Banking casted 
doubt over the adequacy of operational subsidiarisation whilst feared that full subsidiarisation is too 
costly (3).  
On 12th September 2011, the Independent Commission of Banking produced its final report on the 
future of banking on 12th September 2011. The core proposal is that any significant bank wishing to 
carry out retail banking in the UK must place its retail activities in a separate subsidiary from its 
investment/wholesale activities. Branches (rather than subsidiaries) of foreign banks can carry out 
‘mandated services’ (4) such as retail banking. This leads to the first question: is cross-border 
banking in the EEA best served by branches of subsidiaries? 
This paper aims to address the question of financial stability from a wider European perspective. The 
first question is whether cross-border retail banking is best served by branches or subsidiaries? The 
second question concerns the legality of setting up subsidiaries in the European Union. Whilst there 
are no legal problems for UK based banks setting up subsidiaries for their retail activities, there 
might be a legal hurdle for requiring foreign banks setting up subsidiaries in the UK. The third 
question concerns EU cross-border banking regulation and supervision. Are the ‘passporting system’ 
and the home country supervisory approach still applicable in this post-financial crisis era? 
The author accepts that partial subsidiarisation, whichever form it may take, will not provide a 
panacea to financial crises. Rather, it provides a partial solution to modern banking. This paper 
analyses the concepts of subsidiarisation and the UK insolvency regime in detail. This is useful in 
shaping the future landscape of banking supervision and regulation in light of the sovereign debt 
crisis in the Euro zone. Financial stability is thus a main concern for UK banks. 
This author will start off with a literature review of subsidiarisation in section 2, followed by a 
synopsis of the financial crisis of 2007-2009 and the effect of cross-banking in the UK in section 3. 
With the overriding theme of financial stability in mind, section 4 contains an analysis of the legality 
of setting up subsidiaries in the EU. Corporate governance issues are discussed in section 6. Section 6 
discusses the UK Special Resolution Regime, which was required to rescue distressed banks in the UK. 
Section 7 is a discussion of EU supervision and insolvency framework. Finally, section 8 concludes. 
 
Section 2: Literature review 
Subsidiarisation has been the buzzword in the UK for the past 12-18 months although it is not a 
novel concept. Ever since the collapse of BCCI and Barings Bank, policy makers and academics have 
discussed the advantages and disadvantages of subsidiarisation. BCCI collapsed in July 1991 primarily 
due to fraud. The BCCI incident was very complex, involving a complicated legal structure of the 
bank so that no single financial regulator would have overall oversight of BCCI. Hall (5) opines that 
‘...subsidiarisation would not always be beneficial in a supervisory context — it might, for example, 
reduce the extent of 'parental' backing in an emergency...’ Subsidiarisation allows the local regulator 
to have greater control over subsidiaries of banks. The BCCI case illustrates the difficulty of dealing 
with an international bank where a branch has failed. The failure of Icesave, a UK branch of 
Landsbanki, during the financial crisis of 2007-2009 again demonstrates the difficulty of modern day 
cross-border banking.  
According to Hadjiemmanuil (6), Barings Bank in February 1995 failed due to unauthorised 
derivatives trading in its Singapore subsidiary. After Barings failed, the Bank of England (‘the Bank’) 
was appointed to conduct a review of the international organisation and operational procedures of 
Barings Bank. The Bank concluded that ineffective controls over Nick Leeson’s unauthorised trading 
activities in an overseas subsidiary led to the demise of Barings Bank. Legal structure alone will not 
prevent corporate scandals. Ineffective controls and legal structure failed to prevent the latest 
authorised trading at the London office of UBS. An important consequence of the BCCI and Barings 
incidents is that Basel Accord of 1975 was updated. The Accord set out the principles of national 
regulators supervising financial institutions, whilst cross-border activities are supervised by both 
home and host countries. 
Is cross-border banking best served by branches or subsidiaries? Three recent papers have discussed 
this question in detail. The first paper is by Cerutti et al (7) and the authors focused on the top 100 
international banks in Latin America and Eastern Europe. They found that banks opt for the branch 
structure where the host countries have higher taxes and lower regulatory restrictions. Banks with 
ambitions to strengthen their retail side would normally prefer subsidiaries. Since parent banks are 
not legally liable for their subsidiaries due to the limited liability principle, banks prefer the 
subsidiary model where there are economic risks in the host country. Ring-fencing provisions limit 
the parent bank’s liability to support its branches. Hence in extreme incidents of political upheaval 
and a branch becomes insolvent, the parent bank’s liability is limited. It appears that this concept 
combined with smaller capital and reserve requirements in branches means that banks prefer 
establishing branches in host countries with political risks (7).  
Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (8) agree with Cerutti et al’s results. Risk is the principal factor in deciding 
whether a bank opts for a subsidiary or branch model in the host country. In general, subsidiaries are 
more suitable where there are high economic risks in the host countries due to the limited liability 
principle. Subsidiaries therefore take on more risks. Within the EU, the authors founds that 
subsidiary is the preferred option as political risks are low. They quoted a study whereby in 2006, 
bank subsidiaries hold 60% of total bank assets in EU new member states. Foreign bank branches 
only hold 6.5% of assets (8). The authors remarked that this result is rather surprising since EU 
legislation creates branches easily under the ‘passporting’ regime. Branches have the advantage of 
keeping capital within the group structure. With subsidiaries, there is a danger of capital being 
‘expropriated’ by foreign governments (8). 
Fiechter et al (9) submit that there is a range of factors influencing a banker’s decision in whether 
branches or subsidiaries should be used. These factors include: regulation and tax levels of the host 
country as well as the bank’s business strategy. If a bank’s strategy is to focus on the wholesale 
market, branches are preferred. Branches are more centralised and easier to transfer funds across 
borders. It is more difficult to transfer assets across borders with subsidiaries due to stricter 
firewalls. Nevertheless, Fiechter et al state that global banks (such as HSBC) may prefer the 
subsidiary model since it focuses on local retail clients. HSBC’s motto ‘the world’s local bank’ can 
thus be better served by the subsidiary model.  From the regulator’s perspective, a UK bank wishing 
to expand into countries with weak economies and high business risks would prefer a subsidiary 
model. The host regulator may also prefer the subsidiary model due to the limited liability principle. 
Where countries have under-developed financial systems and need credit at the local level, then 
bank branches may be more suitable. The authors argue that the choice of branches or subsidiaries 
is dependent on factors such as: ‘the quality of a country’s supervision, the adequacy of its 
information-sharing and supervisory coordination, and the systemic importance of the affiliate for 
home and host financial systems’ (9).  
Ultimately, structure alone will not resolve financial crises. Whilst branches have the advantage of 
easy transfer of funds, subsidiaries have the limited liability principle and are less expensive to wind 
up in financial insolvency. Therefore, there must be effective and co-operative insolvency regimes at 
the European and international dimensions. Davies questions whether the subsidiary model is 
cheaper. He submits that: ‘forced subsidiarisation would reduce the efficiency of capital utilisation in 
Europe and impose extra costs on the customers of European banks’ (10) However, he is of the view 
that subsidiarisation is the way forward since it is difficult to achieve harmonisation of insolvency 
laws on the European level. This view is shared by Mervyn King and  Lord Turner when they gave 
evidence at the Independent Commission on Banking Interim Report (3). The subsidiary model is 
easier for national regulators to deal with. The Commission concluded that the subsidiary model 
gives more control to national regulators and may prevent regulatory disputes. It acknowledged the 
shortcomings of the model but states that subsidiarisation may ‘protect individual countries’ fiscal 
bases and financial systems’ (3).  
 
Section 3: The financial crisis of 2007-2009 
Cerutti et al (7) concluded by stating that there is a trade-off between branches and subsidiaries. 
Whilst the former is better when a foreign bank branch is financially distressed, the latter model is 
more likely to expand the retail banking side of the parents. Subsidiaries are also more likely to 
establish larger networks. The financial crisis of 2007-2009 has revealed problems of both branches 
and subsidiaries. When Icelandic banks such as Glitnir, Landsbanki and Kaupthing ran into financial 
trouble, the Icelandic government did not have enough financial resources to compensate UK 
depositors. The UK government had to step in and provide compensation to UK depositors even 
though the Financial Services Authority only has secondary responsibility for regulating and 
supervising the branches of these Icelandic banks. Primary responsibility of supervision lies with the 
Icelandic regulator because the EU Second Banking Directive 1989, the Home State has primary 
responsibility for prudential regulation of branches.  Although Iceland is a non-EU member of the 
European Economic Area (EEA), it is legally bound to implement into its own law all EU directives 
applicable to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital. Whilst Cerutti et al’s 
submission that branches are more likely to expand the retail side of banking is true, the Icelandic 
bank episode has raised concerns of establishing bank branches in other Member States in the EU. 
This procedure is commonly known as ‘passporting’, found in Article 23 of the Capital Requirements 
Directive. If Barclays wish to set up a branch in Belgium, they merely need to notify the Belgian 
authorities. Lehman Brothers adopted a subsidiary model but this did not prevent its UK subsidiary 
from collapse.  
Although the parent company Lehman Brothers is legally distinct and separate from Lehman 
Brothers International Europe, the parent company’s exposure to US subprime mortgages and its 
high leverage affected Lehman Brothers International Europe. According to Zingales (11), Lehman 
Brothers had a leverage of 33 to 1 at the beginning of 2008. This is twice the average leverage of 15 
to 1 of commercial banks.  A drop in 3.3% in assets value would wipe out the entire value of equity 
and insolvency proceedings would follow. Lehman Brothers International Europe utilised an 
accounting device called Repo 105 which masked the size of Lehman Brothers’s balance sheet. There 
was pressure for investment banks such as Lehman Brothers to reduce their leverage at the end of 
2007. Even if Repo 105 was not lethal, it was certainly poisonous. Lehman Brothers had been 
abusing it as far back as 2001, using repurchase agreements to finance assets but, unlike with typical 
repo transactions, treating them for accounting purposes as sold. This enabled Lehman Brothers to 
cover up its true leverage, making it seem lower than it actually was. Lehman Brothers International 
Europe took the lead role in Repo 105 transactions. This is because Lehman Brothers (the parent 
company) had difficulty complying with SFAS 140, the US accounting rules. They could not obtain 
true sale transactions, which meant that assets could not go off-balance. The leverage ratio was thus 
not reduced. In the UK, Linklaters, a London based law firm was able to obtain true sale status for 
Lehman Brothers International Europe. Anton Valukas states in his report: "Although the Linklaters’s 
letter was written for the exclusive benefit of Lehman Brothers International Europe, a significant 
volume of Lehman's Repo 105 transactions was executed for the benefit and using the securities of 
one or more US-based Lehman entities” (12). It is important to note that there is no evidence that 
Linklaters acted illegally. Regulatory arbitrage succeeded here due to difference in international 
financial regulations and standards. This lacuna in accounting and financial regulation must be 
addressed immediately. Accountants and lawyers must co-operate to stop regulatory arbitrage.  
The second problem was the inability of UK insolvency law to deal with the situation. As Lord Turner 
said: ‘global banking institutions are global in life but national in death’ (13). UK corporate insolvency 
law was inadequate in dealing with the financial crisis. Corporate insolvency law ‘deals only with 
institutions that are already drained of economic value’ (14). This is too late for banks. When banks 
are in financial distress, time is of the essence to minimise externalities. Government authorities 
need powers to rescue banks immediately to avoid widespread panic. These powers were lacking 
under the UK corporate insolvency regime. The FSA were thus unable to take control of Northern 
Rock quickly when the latter was technically still solvent. This made it difficult for the FSA to sell 
Northern Rock since it had already lost franchise value (15). The FSA was unable to rescue Lehman 
Brothers International Europe on the same principle even though in theory, they had more 
supervisory control over subsidiaries than branches. 
Reputation and goodwill of a business might save its subsidiaries. Even if the parent bank is not 
legally obliged to rescue the ailing subsidiary, the former may be so concerned about the reputation 
of the banking group as a whole that it will rescue the subsidiary. Professor Goodhart gave the 
example of Bear Stearns when he gave evidence before the Independent Commission on Banking. 
Bear Stearns had several hedge funds operating as subsidiaries. They were exposed to the US sub-
prime crisis and Bear Stearns rescued these hedge funds due to reputational concerns (16). Lord 
Turner mentioned in his review that the German government supported Hypo Real Estate despite 
the fact that it was its Irish subsidiary where most of the problems began (13) Thus, reputational risk 
may displace the danger of moral hazard, where the concern is that a bank will allow its subsidiary to 
collapse. Moral hazard is classical incentive problem (17). It takes place when ‘the principal cannot 
observe the agent’s behaviour but can see the optimality of the behaviour’ (17). As shareholders are 
dispersed and the ‘exit’ approach is favoured in the United Kingdom, shareholders (principals) find it 
difficult to monitor bankers (agents). There is thus a danger of excessive risk-taking in the absence of 
close monitoring. The rescue in Bear Stearns appears to alleviate the fear of moral hazard. 
Kahn and Winton go further and argue that subsidiaries will decrease moral hazard (18). Kahn and 
Winton’s model shows that by putting bad loans into a subsidiary, this would protect the rest of the 
assets. There will thus be a bipartite system, with good loans in one subsidiary and bad loans in 
another. Moral hazard is in Kahn and Winton’s view, ‘the bipartite structure improves incentives, not 
because investors can better observe the institution's actions or loan quality, but because this 
structure reduces potential gains from risk shifting’ (18). Time will tell whether Standard Chartered’s 
concern of an increased risk in moral hazard if retail banking is severed from the rest of the bank is a 
real danger in practice. In any case, a bank levy on banks should be made compulsory so that the 
cost for bank rescues is internalised. The Independent Commission on Banking’s recommendations 
of holding more equity and creditors (rather than taxpayers) absorbing losses are welcomed (3). In 
the view of the Independent Commission on Banking, ‘loss-absorbing debt is essential to resolution. 
The two are complements’(4). Equity is better than capital because the former ‘is the only form of 
loss-absorbing capacity that works both pre- and post-resolution’(4).  
 
Section 4: Legality of subsidiaries under EU law 
The Independent Commission on Banking Final Report states that ‘mandated services’ (retail banking) 
could be provided in the UK by branches of foreign banks, although any significant banks based 
outside the EEA wishing to carry out mandated services in the UK should generally be required to 
establish a UK subsidiary. De la Mata Munoz (19) has raised an interesting point about the legality of 
cross-border subsidiaries within the European Union. This will be of interest to foreign bank 
challengers wishing to provide retail banking activities in the UK. He submits that forced 
subsidiarisation for cross-border banking is against the European principle of freedom of 
establishment enshrined in Article 49 of the Treaty of Freedom of European Union (TFEU). The 
argument is that companies have the option to run businesses in the EU as branches, agencies or 
subsidiaries. Therefore, forced subsidiarisation is invalid under EU law. There are exceptions to 
freedom of establishment available under the TFEU, such as Articles 51-55. De la Mata Munoz 
opines that Article 51.2 TFEU has never been used to justify a restriction of activity within the EU. 
Further, EU case law such as Commission v. France (Case 270/83) is an illustration where the 
European Court of Justice has applied a very narrow approach to the exception. De la Mata Munoz 
then argued that the use of subsidiaries has an overriding general interest such as financial stability. 
Nevertheless, he argued that this was unnecessary because regulation can rectify the existing 
problems.  Measures such as ‘reinforcing host country control, increasing regulatory convergence 
and enhancing supervisory standards’ should address weaknesses of cross-border banking (De la 
Mata Munoz 2010). He concluded that forced subsidiarisation is in breach of EU law. If this view is 
adopted, then a foreign bank cannot operate retail activities in the UK since Vickers’s 
recommendation requires a subsidiary model for all retail activities in the UK. The case of Societe 
Papillon v Ministere du Budget, des Comptes Publics et de la Fonction Publique (C-418/07) 
confirmed the narrow interpretation of proportionality in EU jurisdiction. In this case, a group 
taxation regime was held as a restriction on the freedom of establishment contrary to Article 43 of 
the EC Treaty. Although the taxation regime was necessary to harmonise tax systems, this went 
beyond what was justifiable to achieve the aim of harmonisation.  
Is forced subsidiriasation justifiable to achieve the aim of financial stability? Financial stability is 
achieved through a trio of structural reform, macro and micro prudential regulation and corporate 
governance. Structural reform includes the subsidiary model. Arguably, if a foreign bank operates 
through a branch in the UK and it has sufficient equity to absorb the losses, then forced 
subsidiriasation is not justifiable to achieve financial stability. Forced subsidiriasation may be seen as 
a backup in case there is insufficient loss-absorbing equity in a bank. Whilst it is possible to amend 
Article 49 TFEU so that a bank can operate in the UK as long as it holds sufficient loss-absorbing 
equity, this is unlikely to be viable in practice. First, the levels of equity in a bank fluctuate regularly 
and frequently. It may be too late to find sufficient liquidity to rescue a failing bank in time. Secondly, 
the Special Resolution Regime under the UK Banking Act 2009 applies to UK subsidiaries of foreign 
banks but not to UK branches of foreign banks. It would be undesirable for the FSA to be prevented 
from rescuing branches of foreign banks in times of crises, especially international ones. Banks are 
interconnected and an effective resolution regime is necessary to minimise systemic effects of bank 
failure. Thirdly, branches and subsidiaries are governed by different supervisory and regulatory 
frameworks in the EU. Home country supervision should be replaced by host country supervision to 
provide a more effective supervisory regime in the EU. Host country intervention is needed in times 
of crises. This is further discussed in section 7. Therefore, it is submitted that subsidiarisation is 
justifiable to achieve the aim of financial stability. 
Two European policymakers, Vicky Ford and Thomas Huertas,  have warned that the increasing use 
of covered bonds are ringfenced for bondholders, leaving depositors with fewer assets.(20) Covered 
bonds are debt securities backed by cash. They are tied to mortgages but they remain on the bank’s 
balance sheets. The expectation is that they will be included in ring-fencing. However, the definition 
of ‘mandated services’ is narrowly defined in the Independent Commission on Banking. ‘Mandated 
services’ only cover deposits and overdrafts to individuals and small and medium sized organisations. 
The rationale of ring-fencing the retail side of banks is to protect depositors. The common belief is 
that deposits are used to fund investment banking. Since the latter is considered as riskier, 
depositors are in danger of losing their deposits. According to a recent research by Deutsche Bank, 
this belief is misguided. Apart from HSBC where they wholly fund its retail division by deposits, all 
the other major banks do not have sufficient deposits to do so (Volk B cited in Alloway 2011). In fact, 
there is an estimated funding loan/deposit funding gap of £150,000. One solution to fund this gap is 
via products such as covered bonds. There is a complication with covered bonds though. The assets 
which back residential mortgage based securities and covered bonds are not available to depositors 
immediately. The effect of this is that the loan/deposit ratio will decrease if residential mortgages 
backed by covered bonds and residential mortgage backed securities are excluded. An example was 
given in relation to Barclays (Volk B cited in Alloway 2011). Without ring-fencing, loans encumbered 
for covered bonds constitute 2% of assets. Depositors therefore have access to 98% of 
unencumbered assets. Deposits form 24% of liabilities. With retail ring-fencing, total unencumbered 
assets only constitute 80% of assets whilst deposits form 81% of liabilities (Volk B cited in Alloway 
2011). The recommendation made by Volk is to place a limit on how much banks can rely on covered 
bonds for funding. This is very sensible. It would be desirable for European and international 
legislators to impose a restriction on covered bonds. Until such restrictions come into force, banks 
should improve their loan/deposit ratio. The counter-argument of improving the loan/deposit ratio 
is that reducing leverage will reduce profitability. There is empirical evidence that there is a negative 
relation between profitability and leverage ratios (21), (22), (23). However, Long and Malitz (24) do 
not find such a relation between leverage and profitability. Naturally, profitability of banks is 
affected by a range of factors, both external and internal. Therefore, leverage is only one factor 
which affects profitability. Co-operation from banks is needed to maintain financial stability in the 
UK market. 
 
Section 5: Corporate Governance 
The final element of the trio to financial stability is good corporate governance. The response from 
Elphick (25) to the Independent Commission on Banking Report emphasises corporate governance. It 
is worth noticing that Elphick has drawn on his experience on the success of ring-fencing in the water 
industry. Wessex Water was ring-fenced and a subsidiary of Azurix Europe Limited and Enron (26). 
When Enron collapsed in December 2011, Wessex Water survived due to the subsidiary model. The 
success of the subsidiary model in the water industry is not necessarily guaranteed in the financial 
sector. However, we can learn from this success and see what improvements we can make. Elphick 
believes that the ringfenced company should have an entirely separate board to its parent.  
Ofwat requires the ringfenced company should ‘act independently of the parent company or the 
controlling shareholder’ (25). This is particularly important where the investment banking arm is in 
financial distress. The retail banking subsidiary would be under pressure from its parent. 
Independence of board, which includes an independent chair and non-executive directors, is vital to 
financial stability. Good financial regulation goes hand-in-hand with good corporate governance 
practice. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has called attention to the need to 
study, understand, and improve the corporate governance of financial entities. Independence of the 
board is a vital concept in corporate governance. The justification is that objectivity and impartiality 
can be exercised when making decisions when the board is independent. Mere rubber-stamping 
decisions and strategies undermine board effectiveness. De Andres and Vallelado (27) used cross-
country evidence and demonstrated that bank performance has an inverted U relationship with 
board size and more outside directors will improve performance. Pathan (28) supports this 
conclusion as well, who also argued that more independent directors appear to lead to low risk-
taking. Arguably, independent directors are good for corporate governance. They control risk-taking 
and produce better performance. It is therefore right to support paragraph (g) of the final principle 
on ring-fencing of the Independent Commission on Banking (4). Paragraph (g) states that: 
‘the board of the ring-fenced bank should be independent. The precise degree of independence 
appropriate would depend on the proportion of the banking group’s assets outside the ring-fenced 
bank. Except in cases where the vast majority of the group’s assets were within the ring-fenced bank, 
the majority of directors should be independent non-executives of whom: 
i. one is the Chair; and 
ii. no more than one sits on the board of the parent or another part of the group’. 
Through the provision of (g)(ii), conflict of interest would hopefully be eradicated. This is a common 
problem identified by Allen et al (29), where some of the directors in the subsidiary board also held 
positions in the parent bank. This is worrying in view of the conflict of interest. Subsidiaries are 
legally independent entities and are subject to the host country’s regulation and supervision. 
Lehman Brothers’ UK subsidiary was subject to British regulation even though it was a US bank. A 
conflict of interest scenario could arise if a director sits on both the parent and subsidiary boards and 
the subsidiary is facing financial difficulties. Should the director act in the best interest of the parent 
company or the subsidiary? This is an unsatisfactory situation and under section 175 of the UK 
Companies Act 2006, the director concerned should be advised to either remove the conflict in the 
first place or to resign. Therefore, Allen et al (29) opined that foreign banks must include 
independent non-executive directors on their boards to make sure that the management is following 
the regulation and acting in the best interest of the local institution. The author so far supports the 
Independent Commission on Banking’s recommendations on corporate governance. 
Independence alone however, is insufficient on boards of banks. A recent paper by Allen et al (29) 
studied the corporate governance structure of listed foreign subsidiaries in host countries. Their 
results revealed that the number of independent directors with financial expertise is low. This is 
worrying as modern banking is complex. Securitisation and financial products are difficult to grasp. It 
is therefore advisable that bank board should have directors with financial expertise who can 
understand the risks involved. David Beatty of the Rotman School of Management believes that the 
emphasis on expertise is important for bank boards. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 states that the 
chair of the Audit Committee must have solid financial credentials and members of the audit 
committee were expected to be ‘financially literate.’(30) Beatty added that it would be desirable for 
boards to have a risk expert as well as a compensation expert. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 had a 
spillover effect on Canadian corporate governance. The UK Corporate Governance Code has not 
followed suit in this area. However, it is submitted that the ‘expertise model’ advocated by Beatty 
makes sense and adds value to company boards. Risk management in many banks failed during the 
financial crisis. Excessive leverage, poor internal controls and financial ratios led to liquidity 
problems in many banks. The UK Corporate Governance Code Main Principle C.2 Risk Management 
and Internal Control states: 
‘The board is responsible for determining the nature and extent of the significant risks it is wiling to 
take in achieving its strategic objectives. The board should maintain sound risk management and 
internal control systems.’ 
Code Provision C.2.1 provides: 
‘The board should, at least annually, conduct a review of the effectiveness of the company’s risk 
management and internal control systems and should report to shareholders that they have done so. 
The review should cover all material controls, including financial, operational and compliance 
controls.’ 
In addition Financial Services Authority DTR 7.2.4R requires companies to describe the main features 
of the internal control and risk management systems in relation to the financial reporting process. 
The Financial Reporting Council is currently considering whether the Turnbull Guidance on internal 
controls needs to be revised after meeting company directors and executives in December 2010. In 
particular, questions such as who is responsible for oversight and operational management will be 
discussed. How should the board, board committees and management interact? It is submitted that 
the Financial Reporting Council should also consider the necessity of having expert directors in 
finance, risk and compensation. 
Therefore, the author submits that forced subsidiarisation of retail ring-fencing can be justified on 
grounds of financial stability. Protection of depositors and taxpayers is of paramount importance, 
especially in light of the financial crisis of 2007-2009. The trio of the subsidiary model, corporate 
governance and macro/micro regulation is fundamental to achieve this aim. 
 
Section 6: UK Special Resolution Regime 
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 has shown the spill over effect of banks when the UK government 
had to nationalise Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley, as well as injecting £850 million into the 
Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Banking Group. With the former two banks, the UK government 
faced the choices of insolvency or nationalisation. The existing UK insolvency law did not provide a 
mechanism to resolve a financially distressed bank. The Bank Special Provisions Act 2008 was passed 
on 21st February 2008 to facilitate the nationalisation of Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley. It 
was also used to resolve the UK entities of various Icelandic banks. The priority of the UK 
government during the financial crisis was to limit the costs of bank failures within the industry.  The 
Banking Act 2009 on 21st February 2009 replaced the Bank Special Provisions Act 2008 and contains 
a Special Resolution Regime (SRR) to deal with distressed banks. To date, only Dunfermline Building 
Society has been resolved by the SRR.  Therefore, the SRR has not yet been tested against UK banks 
with cross-border activities.  
Would the SRR be equipped for distressed UK banks with cross-border activities? The SRR applies to 
foreign branches (but not foreign subsidiaries) of UK banks. It also applies to UK subsidiaries of 
foreign banks but not to UK branches of foreign banks. The SRR would thus be able to deal with the 
UK subsidiary of Lehman Brothers should a similar scenario takes place. The SRR allows foreign 
authorities ring-fencing local assets of UK bank branches (not subsidiaries) of foreign banks. Hence, if 
Bank of America’s UK branch is in distress, the American authorities have full power to ring-fence 
the assets of the UK branch. This seems sensible in theory given that branches are part of the parent 
while subsidiaries are separate legal entities and locally incorporated. The UK were somewhat 
fortunate in the financial crisis since the banks which were nationalised were primarily domestic 
(31). There was no international element to Northern Rock or Bradford & Bingley. The SRR thus 
compliments and supplements the subsidiary model. 
Over the past 18 months, the banking crisis has since evolved into a sovereign debt crisis.  There is a 
likelihood of cross-border spill over if there is a sovereign debt restructuring of Greece (15). 
According to the Bank of England’s Financial Stability Report of June 2011, although UK banks only 
have a moderate direct exposure to sovereign debts in Greece, they are exposed to other Euro zone 
countries such as France and Germany. France and Germany have large exposures to weaker 
countries in the Euro zone. Any default or stress in the Euro zone is likely to affect UK banks 
negatively (15). UK banks have avoided the impact of the sovereign debt crisis so far because they 
have reduced their leverage and increased the amount of capital. However, the Euro zone is still 
heavily reliant on the wholesale market, with almost 50% of its loans borrowed from the wholesale 
market (15). Therefore, UK banks are prone to systemic risks and it is essential to have effective 
cross-border insolvency resolution, at least on the European level. The author agrees with Davies 
(2010) that in practice, international co-operation of global banks is very difficult to achieve due to 
political factors. Therefore, one must start at the national level before moving onto co-operation at 
the European level. Nonetheless, national regulators should strive to co-operate on the European 
level. 
 
Section 7: EU supervision and insolvency framework 
The current EU supervision framework provides that the Home State has primary responsibility for  
prudential regulation of branches.  The host Member State authorities have responsibility for 
liquidity regulation, in co-operation with Home State authorities. Finally, the deposit protection 
regimes are national. Subsidiaries follow the local deposit protection regime in the host country 
whilst branches are protected by the bank’s home country. 
  Branch Subsidiary 
 Prudential 
Regulation 
Liquidity 
Regulation 
Deposit 
Insurance 
Cross- 
Liability 
Prudential 
Regulation 
Deposit 
Insurance 
Cross-
Liability 
Home 
unit 
Home 
Regulator 
Joint Home Yes Home 
Regulator 
Home No 
Foreign 
unit 
Home Joint Home Yes Host Host No 
Source: Adapted from Calzolari & Loranth, 2005 (32) 
 
The principal tenet of the current EU supervision regime is nationalism. Responsibility for financial 
stability is national. Supervision/regulation is national with only some exceptions. This model is 
clearly dated in light of modern banking. The author submits that a more European approach to 
supervision is necessary. As Mervyn King and Lord Turner favour the subsidiary model, the 
implication is that the host supervisor will have more role in supervising foreign banks (33). This is 
necessary to ensure that foreign banks’ levels of capital and liquidity are sufficient. Buiter favours 
this approach (34). He submits that the European tradition of home-country dominance is 
unworkable. In the collapse of Icesave, a branch of Landsbanki, it was the UK, not Iceland, which felt 
most of the pain. Again with the collapse of Lehman Brothers International European, the UK bore 
the brunt of the financial disaster. Therefore, it is only logical that the host country regulator should 
take a leading role in regulation and supervision of cross-border banks. Article 40 of the Capital 
Requirements Directive should therefore be amended so that the host (not the home) supervisor 
has more supervisory powers. 
 
The European Commission is currently drafting the Capital Requirements Directive IV (the Directive). 
The Directive adopts a ‘multi-dimension’ to regulation and supervision (35). It has regulations on 
capital, liquidity and leverage ratios. These ratios reflect the balance sheets of banks better than 
solely concentrating on capital requirements. In addition to Basel III implementation, the proposal 
introduces several important changes to the banking regulatory framework. The Directive calls for 
enhanced governance. In the opinion of the European Commission, the self-regulatory nature of 
corporate governance led to weak compliance by credit institutions and investment banks. 
Supervisory authorities found it difficult to monitor or control the corporate governance standards 
because there was no defined role for the supervisors. Further corporate governance failures include 
inadequate board oversight on risks and ineffective challenge of risk policies. The latter is caused by 
insufficient time spent at boards and lack of expertise by some directors. One of the options that the 
European Commission is considering is requiring directors of credit institutions and investment 
banks to have expertise. Disclosure of the skills and expertise of board members is required under 
the option. For the reasons given above in section 5, it is submitted that the requirements of 
financial expertise and commitment by board members are necessary to improve corporate 
governance. 
 
The European Commission also recommended enhanced supervision and sanctions.  With the 
former proposal, the emphasis is on micro prudential supervision. The onus is on the individual 
institution to prepare a supervisory programme every year on the basis of a risk assessment. The 
latest scandal at UBS demonstrated that rouge traders will circumvent internal controls and systems 
without proper supervision.  On-site supervisory examinations, higher standards and more forward-
looking supervisory assessments should be adopted. If a credit institution or investment bank 
breaches EU regulations, it is proposed that supervisors can apply sanctions. Sanctions would have a 
deterrent effect on credit institutions and investment banks. Sanctions could take the form of 
administrative fines of up to 10% of an institution's annual turnover, or temporary bans on certain 
board members. The financial crisis of 2007-2009 demonstrated that effective enforcement is 
necessary to punish the wrong-doers. So far in the UK, only two Northern Rock directors have been 
punished. David Baker (former chief executive) and Richard Baclay (former managing credit director) 
of Northern Rock were fined and banned by the FSA for hiding debt. The European Commission 
should therefore should regularly monitor, control and review compliance of EU regulations. 
 
Section 8: Conclusion 
Structural reform in the form of subsidiarisation is required to improve financial stability in the UK. 
Full subsidiarisation is too costly and too restrictive for modern banking. The Independent 
Commission on Banking’s Final Report is to be commended. Requiring foreign universal banks to set 
up cross-border retail subsidiaries in the UK does not breach EU law as it is necessary to maintain 
financial stability. Article 40 of the Capital Requirements Directive needs to be amended to give host 
country supervisor more powers. This is necessary if we want to encourage foreign banks to provide 
retail banking in the UK. The EU ‘passporting’ regime and home country regulation are thus dated. 
Empirical evidence to date reveals that subsidiaries are generally well suited for retail banking due to 
the limited liability principle and extensive local network. The establishment of a subsidiary, rather 
than a branch however, does not guarantee financial stability per se. A subsidiary is not necessarily 
easier to separate from the parent company. It may rely on the parent for liquidity, support services 
and/or business. For subsidiarisation to function well, the subsidiaries need to be strictly 
independent subsidiaries with controls on intra-group operations and no reliance on the parent for 
funding. Directors also need to be experts in order to govern and manage risks well. Corporate 
governance and macro/micro regulatory aspects such as capital, liquidity and leverage ratios all play 
an important part in financial stability. Therefore, the Capital Requirements Directive IV is welcomed. 
The trio of subsidiarisation, macro/micro prudential regulation and corporate governance are all 
vital to maintaining a robust and stable financial system. The problem of interconnectedness should 
hopefully be reduced with structural reforms and the UK resolution regime. The Independent 
Commission on Banking recognised that time is required to implement the reforms. Banks have thus 
until 2019 to implement the reforms.  
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